A nearly 1.7 million BGN (excluding VAT) public tender for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the main street “Alexander Stamboliyski” in Nedelino has been awarded to the small Sofia-based company “GJ Tay 2008” EOOD amid a lack of genuine competition. All other five participants in the procedure were excluded by the commission without providing specific and convincing reasons in the documentation. The winner submitted an offer amounting to 1,686,195 BGN (excluding VAT), just about 1% below the estimated value of 1,697,355 BGN set by the contracting authority in the announcement.
The procedure was initiated on March 19, 2025, through a decision by Nedelino Mayor Boyan Kekayov. It was announced as an open public tender for the execution of construction and installation works along the approximately 1,683-meter stretch of “Alexander Stamboliyski” Street, including cold recycling of the pavement, laying of a new road structure, sidewalk and curb construction, drainage, signaling, and environmental measures. The awarding criterion was “lowest price,” with no consideration of technical or quality parameters.
From Five Bidders to One
According to official documents, five companies submitted bids by the deadline: “GJ Tay 2008” EOOD, “Gochev Style” EOOD, “EMT Stroy” EOOD, “Megainvest-Hold” EOOD, and “European Roads” JSC. Only one of these reached the final stage of opening the price proposals. As per Protocol No. 3 from May 23, 2025, only the bid of “GJ Tay 2008” EOOD was decipherted at this stage, with a total offer of 1,686,195 BGN (excluding VAT). The document states that the participant used a “hourly rate – 9.80 BGN/hour; additional labor costs – 100%; machinery – 46%; delivery and warehouse costs – 16%; profit – 10%,” without any explanation of the justification for these figures.
The four disqualified companies were eliminated at various stages of the procedure. One of them—local firm “Gochev Style” EOOD—had previously carried out repairs on the same street in 2020 and 2022, including work on the southern sidewalk. Despite this experience, the committee found that its technical proposal contained “discrepancies in the linear schedule that pose a significant risk to the quality and lawful execution of the contract,” leading to its exclusion under Article 107, paragraph 2, point “a” of the Public Procurement Act. According to the contracting authority, the responsibility for these deficiencies rests “unquestionably” with the participant who prepared the proposal.
Disqualification Without Explanation
Particularly noteworthy is the exclusion of the other two participants—”MegaInvest-Hold” and “European Roads”—without any concrete justification. Protocol No. 2 from May 19, 2025, states that their proposals did not meet the technical specifications, but fails to specify which requirements were violated, what deficiencies or errors were identified, or whether the participants had the opportunity to correct them. The wording is identical for both companies: “the proposal does not meet the technical specifications and is not subject to evaluation under the methodology.” This lack of detailed reasoning renders the committee’s decision opaque and raises doubts about its objectivity.
The disqualified firms are experienced and possess significantly higher financial and personnel capacity than the selected contractor. “European Roads” AD is one of the country’s largest road construction companies with a turnover of 125 million BGN and over 70 employees as of 2021, while “MegaInvest-Hold” EOOD reported a turnover of 8.55 million BGN, with a stable staff and completed infrastructure projects. In comparison, the winning company, “GJ Tay 2008” EOOD, has a capital of only 5,100 BGN, nine employees, and revenues of 297,000 BGN in 2023 (with a profit of 79,000 BGN) and 879,000 BGN in 2022 (with a profit of 175,000 BGN).
Same Procedures, Same Winning Firm
A search on bird.bg for public procurement shows that from 2014 to 2022, “GJ Tay 2008” EOOD has executed seven contracts totaling 1,889,725 BGN. Five of these were awarded by the Municipality of Asenovgrad, and two by the Municipality of Nedelino. The first contract in Nedelino was signed on April 27, 2022, for road repairs near the village of Vurli Dol, valued at 74,242 BGN (excluding VAT). Only “GJ Tay 2008” participated in the bidding process, with no other candidates involved.
The next contract, dated June 20, 2022, concerns ongoing repairs to the street network, valued at over 454,000 BGN excluding VAT. Three companies initially participated, but “Kris-MT” and “Grafit Komers” were disqualified. According to the official protocol, the reasons cited were discrepancies between the calendar and linear schedules and inconsistencies in the number of workers. Similar to the 2025 procurement, “GTI 2008” remained the sole qualified contender and won the contract with minimal competition. The recurring structure of the procedures, the identical approach of the committees, and the formalistic reasons cited for exclusion suggest a systemic model of awarding contracts where genuine competition is effectively eliminated before the price offers are even opened.
No violation found, but no competition either
The procedure passed a formal preliminary review by a financial controller, who found no violations, noting in their report that “the criteria do not unjustly favor anyone and do not restrict competition.” In practice, however, all competing companies were eliminated at a stage where the contracting authority has considerable discretion—without meaningful external oversight of its decisions.
A formal contest with a predetermined winner
The outcome is the awarding of a nearly 2 million BGN contract including VAT, without real competition, with disqualified participants who demonstrated proven capacity and on grounds that do not withstand thorough scrutiny. Comparing the 2022 and 2025 procedures reveals similarities in the committee’s approach, participant selection, the nature of disqualifications, and the final result. This points not to an isolated decision but a possible model of systemic favoritism, whereby the procurement processes are formally open but effectively preordained.
