
The first politician from the years of the Transition who realized how detrimental the ethnic model of Ahmed Dogan was to the establishment of a sustainable democratic society was Ivan Kostov. He referred to agent Sava (the agent name of the leader of the DPS) as “the curse of Bulgaria,” but he never found the time to seek ways and means to integrate the Muslim community in our country. The reproduction of the DPS in every subsequent parliament assigned to the ethnic party the eternal role of a balancer. A role that Dogan, and now Peevski, utilize well,
to cash in their support for the ruling parties—whether explicit or hidden.
Boyko Borisov managed to establish, through “the builder of the party” Tsvetan Tsvetanov, structures of GERB in mixed regions and to elevate his candidates for mayors from within the Muslim community. Not only that, but GERB succeeded in splitting the ethnic vote there, and in the last local elections in 2019, it won mayoral elections in 12 villages in the Kardzhali region—the bastion of the DPS— and over 30 in Ludogorie. This was a clear case of
detaching “living flesh” from the body of the ethnic party.
At the same time, in other parts of the country, GERB ceded ground to the DPS by fielding formal mayoral candidates who lost the race, as was the case in two large villages in the Kazanlak municipality—Hadji Dimitar and Koprinka. In Kazanlak, the winning third-term mayor Galina Stoyanova appointed Ahmed Mehmed—the leader of the DPS in the city—as her deputy mayor, even though the two parties did not run in a coalition format in the elections and given that Dogan’s party has no more than 2,000 voters in the municipality. These and similar moves reveal
backstage and unprincipled negotiations
between GERB and the DPS for years.
In the context of a political and institutional crisis and ongoing protests lasting more than two months calling for the resignation of Borisov and Chief Prosecutor Ivan Geshev, sociologists are measuring changes in citizens’ attitudes towards political parties, with surveys predicting that the party created by showman Slavi Trifonov, “There is Such a People,” will take third place in the next National Assembly. The DPS remains in fourth place, and there is a real risk of losing its previous role, which would be
a significant blow—not just to their image—for Dogan and Peevski.
To counter this, they have devised a move to put Borisov on the defensive—promising him their support for a full government mandate in exchange for the active “utilization” of funds from European programs and a renouncement of competition for the Muslim vote. However, Dogan and Peevski have “made their calculations without the innkeeper” if they believe that this would automatically transfer votes back from GERB to the DPS. This is simply because the two parties are not interconnected, and voters from mixed regions are no longer subjects who carry out the will of their masters, at least not those who have rebelled against and rejected Dogan’s tyranny.
Observers of the processes within the Bulgarian Muslim communities do not expect a new encapsulation of the ethnic vote; on the contrary, they foresee its distribution to other parties, including the newly established formation of Tsvetan Tsvetanov, among others. This expectation is further fueled by the well-known fact that
the DPS does not forgive; it seeks revenge against traitors.
In 2019, GERB split about 150,000 votes from the DPS, effectively dismantling the ethnic vote in Bulgaria. This would have been a historical achievement for Borisov if his egotism and desire to cling to power at all costs had not clouded his judgment. Today, he is on his knees before Peevski and Dogan, and the signal he sends to Muslims in the country to return to the mother party deeply disappoints those among them who recognized GERB as the party that offered them a chance for political representation outside the lists of the DPS. For them, there is no turning back; they feel betrayed and are more likely to abandon any political career than to reverse course after having once formed
a front against Dogan and Peevski.
Dissatisfaction within GERB began first in the mixed regions following Borisov’s betrayal of the Muslims in the party. The disintegration of the clientelist party is irreversible, especially after it became clear that their previously idolized leader is dependent.
GERB will follow the fate of NDSV,
even though its collapse will not be as swift, as Borisov’s party has entrenched itself deeply institutionally and holds almost all local power in the country.
The next to leave the sinking ship will be the careerists. The last to perhaps drown will be the idealists, if there are indeed any left in this party. Meanwhile, as the ship sinks, the DPS will siphon off EU funds—until the very last day of this cabinet. This is the bet, and Mustafa Karadayi stated it plainly at the opening of the autumn session of the National Assembly. Those who had ears heard it, and even the deaf understood the priorities of Dogan and Peevski.











